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NEWS OF THE LAW SCHOOL
There were 488 students enrolled in the Law School in
the Fall of 1950. Of these 262 were in the Day School, and
226 were in the Evening School. The entering Day class
contained 114 members, and the entering Evening class
contained 80 members. There were 92 colleges and universities represented in the pre-legal training of the student
body.
Three members of the full-time faculty taught during
the Summer of 1950 in the Summer Session of the George
Washington University Law School, in Washington, D. C.

Professor G. Kenneth Reiblich taught the course in Trusts.
Professor Russell R. Reno taught the course in Estates in
Land. Professor John S. Strahorn, Jr., taught the course
in Conflict of Laws.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REFORM
ACHIEVED IN MARYLAND
During the year 1950 there were accomplished several
definitive reforms in the Maryland criminal procedure. On
January 1, 1950, the new Rules of Criminal Practice and
Procedure, promulgated by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, under the rule-making power, after almost two years
of study and consideration by the Court and by its advisory
committee on rules, went into effect. Likewise, at the
November, 1950, election, the voters adopted a Constitutional amendment, which had been proposed by the Legislature of 1949, and thereby also put into effect the covering
statute, which had been passed by that Legislature to take
effect if the Constitutional amendment were ratified.
While there were other matters covered by the rules
which went into effect at the first of the year, 1950, the
principal achievement was reforming the impasse that
had developed in the Maryland criminal procedure as a
result of the Constitutional provision of 1851, followed in
the prevalent Constitution of 1867, that in criminal cases
the jurors should be judges of the law as well as of the
facts. As a result of the extreme interpretation given to
this provision over the ninety-nine years that it prevailed
intact, the Maryland criminal procedure had become almost
unique in the country, in that there was a dearth of appellate criminal law, resulting from the lack of any effective
system of giving instructions to juries in criminal jury
cases, and from the complete lack of any appellate review
of the sufficiency of the evidence in either jury or non-jury
criminal cases.
This had long put a blight on the development of a body
of Maryland criminal law, and put Maryland in last place
among the American states with respect to having a system
of substantive criminal law, and with respect to effective
supervision of juries, so that the defendants would be protected against unjust verdicts of conviction. In fact, the
State of Indiana was next to last in that regard, but even
there, under their system of having the jury as judges of
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the law, the judges have to give instructions, and there is
some vestige of review. While the reforms of 1950 have
merely brought Maryland up to the level of Indiana in that
regard, at least there is now a vestige of some control of
criminal juries at the level of the law.
The situation was reformed in this fashion. The Court,
on the recommendation of the Rules Committee, apparently
took the position that the lack of review of the sufficiency of
the evidence in non-jury cases (where there is no question
of granting instructions) was based on statute, rather than
on the Constitution, in assimilating non-jury practice to
jury practice. Thus, the Court could, by the exercise of the
rule-making power, supersede the said statute. It did this
by Rule 7 of the new Rules, which provides for a review, as
in civil non-jury and equity cases, of a judgment of conviction by the judge without a jury in a criminal case, at the
level of the sufficiency of the evidence.
In jury cases, there is and was the double-barreled
problem of the review of the sufficiency of the evidence,
and of granting advisory instructions to the jury on the
details of law. Assuming, as the Court did, that the Constitution required that the jury shall remain the judge of the
law, the new Rule 6 provides for advisory instructions to
be given to the juries on the law. Such instructions, including an instruction that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a verdict of guilty, may, and at the request of a
party, must be given. Thus, within the Constitutional
frameworks of 1851 and 1867, the Court, within the same
Rule 6, solved both the difficulties of the lack of review
of the sufficiency of the evidence and of the absence of
mandatory instructions. The prior practice was that the
trial judges did not have to give instructions unless they
wanted to and they rarely did.
Later in the year 1950, the voters of the State, at
the November election, ratified a proposed constitutional
amendment along the same lines, which added to the existing proviso of the 1867 constitution about juries as judges
of law, a further detail that "the Court may pass on the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction.". This
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brought into effect a companion statute which merely
incorporated the provisions of Rule 6, Part (b), already in
effect about instructions on the insufficiency of the evidence, with an added (and probably superfluous) provision
that there could be an appeal to the Court of Appeals from
its refusal. Thus, through a combination of the exercise of
the rule-making power and a parallel pair of legislative
enactments, one a constitutional amendment which was
ratified, and the other a statute which was conditioned
upon the ratification, we have seen, in the year 1950, the
carrying forward of the idea of reforming the Maryland
criminal procedure to remedy its previous shortcomings
with respect to appellate review in criminal cases.
It will be interesting to see what further will come in
the immediate future from either the Court or the Legislature along these lines, whether by way of clarifying any
apparent inconsistencies between the Rules and the Constitution and legislation which are already before us, or
by way of further strengthening the idea of appellate supervision of the action of juries in criminal cases. Certainly
it can be argued that the adoption of the amendment, with
a specific clause for a review of the sufficiency of the evidence, does indicate that the restrictive interpretation of
the old Constitutional provision, as it prevailed for ninetynine years, is now to be relaxed in the opposite direction of
more judicial supervision of jury actions in criminal cases,
through the medium of giving instructions, and reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence.
One point would be whether the provision of Rule 6 (b)
for an instructed verdict as to the insufficiency of the evidence should be made more binding so that it will be
definitive rather than advisory. There is again the problem
of whether there should be adopted the practice of judgment N. 0. V., by analogy to the civil practice, which
practice has been adopted in the civil cases at the level of
review of sufficiency of the evidence by the Court.
Other problems are still left unanswered, both under
the original criminal rules of January 1, 1950, and the
Constitutional change of November, 1950, with its impact
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on those rules. What action should the Court of Appeals
take, for instance, when it does reverse the trial court for
having refused a directed verdict, or a court without a jury
for having convicted when it should have acquitted on the
basis of insufficiency of evidence? Should they reverse
with a new trial, or without a new trial? The answer to that
is in doubt throughout the country, and, perhaps, unless a
definitive rule be adopted, we shall have to expect the
answer to be arrived at by the trial and error method in
the courts.
One final point should be mentioned, and that is whether
the State should be allowed an appeal from the granting of
a directed verdict in a jury case, a judgment N. 0. V. if
such practice be adopted in jury cases, or an acquittal for
insufficient evidence in a non-jury case. In other jurisdictions there seems to be some doubt as to whether the State
can appeal, and the matter has been discussed in recent
Maryland cases with respect to other points.
It could be argued that, to the extent to which the state
is frustrated by a directed verdict which deprives it of the
opportunity to go to the jury and get a conviction, it should
be allowed to appeal and have another chance, as it can
now do when a demurrer (now called motion), is sustained.
These are merely passing suggestions, in remarking on
the forward progress made by the State of Maryland in
having adopted such definite reforms of its criminal procedure during the year 1950, both by way of Rule of Court
on the one hand, and by Constitutional and statutory change
on the other, all directed to the same end, and no attempt
is made to go into the details of the points here raised.
It is interesting to note how this reform of the criminal
procedure fits in to the general pattern of procedural reform in Maryland these past twenty years. Most salient,
perhaps, is the re-constitution of the Court of Appeals on
a full time basis, under the so-called Bond Plan, which
principally effected that reform, although it also involved
the permissive assignment of judges around the State in
necessary cases, and gave final constitutional sanction to
the rule-making power of the Court of Appeals. This latter
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was used in the reform of criminal procedure now being
discussed.
This rule-making power, long since exercised in Equity
and Appeal cases under the Constitution of 1867, had earlier
been used in civil law cases by virtue of a statute, prior to
Constitutional sanction of the Bond Plan. The Bond Plan
merely secured this constitutional sanction for the rulemaking power in all situations, which might include five,
i. e., (1) the making of rules governing appeals, (2) the
rules for admission to the bar, (3) the equity rules, long
since accepted, (4) the civil law rules, and (5) for the first
time, under the Constitutional sanction, the making of rules
in criminal cases, first exercised by the Rules which went
into effect January 1, 1950.
Beyond the re-constitution of the Court of Appeals,
assignment of judges, and the complete ratification of the
rule-making power for all necessary purposes, we have also
seen in the last two decades the reform of the Justice of the
Peace system in the counties by the trial magistrate system,
the similar elevation of the People's Court of Baltimore
City from Justice of the Peace status to that of a court of
record approaching that of the Supreme Bench, and, likewise the elevation of the Juvenile Court of Baltimore City
as a separate division of the Circuit Court of Baltimore
City, one of the Equity courts.
Of course, there still remain other problems, such as
the abolition of the Orphans' Courts, the consolidation of
the separate courts of Baltimore City and the related
problem of the creation of an integrated domestic relations court or branch of a unified court to handle the overlapping domestic relations problems that now are distributed among various courts. The current reform of
criminal procedure throughout the state is a result long
desired, and caps the climax of the movement for procedural reform in Maryland, come what may in the future.
Now that the reform of Maryland criminal procedure
is in force by the combined routes of an exercise of the rulemaking power, and by Constitutional amendment and
covering legislation, it is pleasant to realize that at least two
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desirable consequences are in prospect. One is that an
accused defendant now has the same protection by way of
appellate review of his trial, against an erroneous and unjust conviction, that heretofore a defendant in a civil case
for a grocery bill of a few hundred dollars has always had.
Further, we may anticipate obtaining some rulings from the
Court of Appeals of Maryland on substantive criminal law,
which heretofore we have not received because it had no
occasion to lay down such rulings, lacking the procedural
machinery that would call them forth, i.e., necessarily
given instructions by the trial judges, and the power and
duty to review the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain
a conviction by a trial judge, with or without a jury.

As this number of the REvIEw was going to press, it was
learned that the Court of Appeals, on February 15, 1951, had
amended the new Criminal Rules to provide, among other
things, for a definitive directed verdict, as discussed above,
by adding a new Rule, 5A, in lieu of the former Rule 6 (b).
The remainder of former Rule 6 (b) was re-lettered. Certain
minor changes were also made in Rule 4 (Depositions), and

Rule 5 (Discovery and Inspection). See BALTIMORE DAILY
REcoRD, February 19, 1951.

